Abstract: The Antidirector Rights Index has been used as a measure of shareholder protection in over 100 articles. A thorough reexamination of the legal data, however, leads to corrections for 33 of 46 countries. The correlation of corrected and original values is only .53. Consequently, many empirical results established with the original index may not be replicable with corrected values. For example, the corrected index does not bear out widely influential claims that shareholder protection is higher in common than in civil law countries, or that shareholder protection predicts market size, ownership dispersion, or resilience to financial crises. At least some of these results cannot be salvaged with other indices either. In particular, no other index provides evidence for the postulated link between shareholder protection and ownership dispersion.
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In their seminal article " Law and Finance" (1998) , La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer (LLS) and Vishny (LLSV) introduced a now famous index of six shareholder protection rules in 49 countries, the "Anti-Director Rights Index" ("original ADRI"). 1 Widely influential results for the original ADRI indicated that common law countries provide stronger investor protection than civil law countries (LLSV 1998) , and that stronger investor protection is associated with greater ownership dispersion in listed firms (LLSV 1998; LLS 1999) and larger capital markets (LLSV 1997 ). Subsequently, well over 100 published empirical papers used the original ADRI. 2 Even though alternative indices are 1 LLSV (1998, table 1) define the ADRI as the sum of:
"Proxy by mail allowed: Equals one if the company law or commercial code allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, and zero otherwise.
Shares not blocked before meeting: Equals one if the company law or commercial code does not allow firms to require that shareholders deposit their shares prior to a general shareholders meeting, thus preventing them from selling those shares for a number of days, and zero otherwise.
Cumulative voting or proportional representation: Equals one if the company law or commercial code allows shareholders to cast all their votes for one candidate standing for election to the board of directors (cumulative voting) or if the company law or commercial code allows a mechanism of proportional representation in the board by which minority interests may name a proportional number of directors to the board, and zero otherwise.
Oppressed minorities mechanism: Equals one if the company law or commercial code grants minority shareholders either a judicial venue to challenge the decisions of management or of the assembly or the right to step out of the company by requiring the company to purchase their shares when they object to certain fundamental changes, such as mergers, asset dispositions, and changes in the articles of incorporation. The variable equals zero otherwise. Minority shareholders are defined as those shareholders who own 10% of share capital or less.
Preemptive rights to new issues: Equals one when the company law or commercial code grants shareholders the first opportunity to buy new issues of stock, and this right can be waived only by a shareholders' vote; equals zero otherwise.
Percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholders' meeting: The minimum percentage of ownership of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders' meeting … is less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample median)." 2 This number is based on a review of the over 600 papers citing LLSV (1998) according to the Social Science Citation Index as of October 10, 2008, in the subject categories "economics" and "business, finance". For example, the ADRI has been used as the main variable, or one of the main variables, to establish connections between legal investor protection and firm valuation (LLSV 2002; Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson 2006) , stock price informativeness (Morck, Yeung, and Yu 2000) , efficient capital allocation , voting premia (Nenova 2003) , firm-level corporate governance mechanisms (Durnev and Kim 2005) , earnings management (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003) , cash holdings (Kalcheva and Lins 2007) , dividend policy (LLSV 2000) , and the depth of financial crises (Johnson et al. 2000) , as well as to test the bonding hypothesis for cross-listing decisions (Doidge 2004; Reese and Weisbach 2002) . Beyond corporate finance, it has also been used, inter alia, as an instrument to show the real effects of financial integration (Imbs 2006; Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad 2005) and the relationship between risk sharing and industrial specialization (Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Yosha 2003) .
now available from LLS (2006) and Djankov and LLS (DLLS) (2008) , the original ADRI continues to be used.
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The quantification of legal rules in the ADRI was a pathbreaking innovation that inspired a vast literature (surveyed in LLS 2008). As a pioneering study, however, LLSV (1998) inevitably employed a method much less refined than mature studies such as Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008) . In particular, index components were ambiguously defined, lawyers were not involved in collecting the data, and the data sources were not documented in detail. The ambiguities in the definitions also made it difficult to evaluate claims by some legal scholars that individual values were inaccurate 4 and hence to judge the overall reliability of the original ADRI and the credibility of the results derived with it.
To investigate these claims systematically, and to obtain a more reliable ADRI, this paper re-collects the legal data for 46 5 countries with a substantially improved method described in Section I. 6 It pursues all plausible interpretations of ambiguous definitions. Regardless of which interpretations are used, the corrected data deviate substantially from the original ADRI. Since the most sensible interpretations also generate the highest correlation with the original ADRI and the most similar regression results, the discussion focuses on this most sensible variant, henceforth referred to as "corrected ADRI" and further discussed in Section II and the Appendix. First, the corrected ADRI does not differ systematically between common and civil law countries. One of LLSV's (1998) two key findings had been that common law countries offer greater legal investor protection than civil law countries. The corrected data do not bear this out.
Second, regression results from LLSV (1997, 1998) linking the ADRI to equity market outcomes cannot be replicated with the corrected data. The second key finding of LLSV (1997 LLSV ( , 1998 had been that greater investor protection is associated with lower ownership concentration and larger equity markets. Again, the corrected data do not bear this out (Section IV.A and B).
Third, the above suggests that many of the numerous other results obtained with the original ADRI may not hold up with corrected data. By way of example, Section IV.C and D attempts to replicate the main results of the two most cited papers using the original ADRI other than those by LLSV. The corrected ADRI provides no evidence for the famous claim of Johnson et al. (2000) that poor investor protection exacerbated the Asian financial crisis of 1997. By contrast, finding that better investor protection is associated with more efficient capital allocation is qualitatively similar with the corrected ADRI. suggest that common law countries provide better investor protection than civil law countries. But, as Section IV shows, none of these indices can revive the results linking 7 According to Google Scholar, these papers had been cited 506 and 595 times, respectively, as of 10/09/2008. The next most frequently cited paper using the ADRI was Nenova (2003) with 501 citations.
poor investor protection to ownership concentration (LLSV 1998 , LLS 1999 ) and the Asian financial crisis (Johnson et al. 2000) . These results seem to have been artifacts of coding error in the original ADRI. Clearly, alternative measures of investor protection will not necessarily support the same conclusions as the original ADRI.
To the extent that different indices do produce divergent results, interpreting the divergences requires judgment on the conceptual validity and empirical reliability of the respective indices. In particular, Section III argues that the corrected ADRI from this paper should be preferred to the revised ADRI that DLLS (2008) created in response to an early manuscript of this paper (Spamann 2005) . These indices differ substantially because DLLS (2008) 
I. IMPROVED DATA COLLECTION, CODING, AND DOCUMENTATION
The present paper improves the data generation method of LLSV (1998) Second, all these data are documented in a 197-page online Appendix with references compliant with standards of the legal literature. By contrast, LLSV (1998) provides no documentation of the law underlying the coding of its index. However, since the most sensible interpretations are also those that yield the highest correlation with the original ADRI, and that produce regression results closest to those reported in LLSV (1997 LLSV ( , 1998 , the quantitative part of this paper only reports values and results for these most sensible interpretations -the "corrected ADRI".
The process described in the preceding paragraphs is the most thorough attempt to obtain reliable legal data in the literature to date. While the involvement of local lawyers has become standard in papers following LLSV (1998), only one paper provides a data documentation (LLS 2006) , and none provides a coding protocol. This includes the two other papers that have revisited the ADRI data (Pagano and Volpin 2005a/b; DLLS 2008) . Besides, the purpose of Pagano and Volpin (2005a/b) was to extend the ADRI through time (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) rather than to verify its accuracy, and the methodology was designed to fit the former but not the latter task. 12 The revision of the ADRI in DLLS (2008) will be discussed in Section III below.
II. COMPARISON OF CORRECTED AND ORIGINAL DATA
The corrected data differ substantially from the original. The first Subsection provides some individual illustrations. The second presents the numbers.
11 LLSV (1998 LLSV ( , 1121 hints that what matters are default rules, but as the discussion will show, the original ADRI data did not adhere to this line.
12 Local "legal experts and business practitioners" received a questionnaire with a table showing the definitions of the ADRI components from LLSV (1998) in the first column, the values assigned in LLSV (1998) for 1993 and the particular country in the second column, and blank cells in the third column, headed: "What is the answer to this question today in [country name]? If it differs from that in the previous column, when was the law changed and how?" In response, the survey respondents spontaneously noted 8 errors in the original ADRI data (Pagano and Volpin 2005b) , but this is much less than shown in Table 1 below. Most likely, when confronted with the original values, each survey respondent interpreted the definitions in a way that accommodated the original values of his/her country.
A. Examples
In many cases, the coding in LLSV (1998), when considered separately for individual countries, could have fit some reading of the ambiguous definitions, but it was inconsistent across countries. For example, neither Finland nor the US 13 provide cumulative voting (a form of proportional board representation) as a default rule, although both allow corporate charter provisions to this effect; however, Finland was coded as 0 and the US as 1 for this index component in LLSV (1998). 14 Likewise, neither the Philippines nor the US allow 10% shareholders to call an extraordinary meeting as a default rule, although both allow corporate charter provisions to this effect; however, the Philippines was coded as 0 and the US as 1 for this index component. an index designed to test the influence of law on such arrangements and, by extension, financial outcomes, this distinction is crucial. It is particularly relevant with respect to charter provisions requiring blocking of shares for a couple of days in order to vote at a shareholder meeting. In practice, such provisions used to be common in, e.g., Germany, but not in the US. However, such provisions were legal in both countries, and neither 13 The relevant rules for the US are federal securities law and the corporate law of Delaware, where more than half of all US publicly traded corporations is incorporated (LLSV 1998 (LLSV , 1119 Values that do not fit any reasonable interpretation of the definition occur mainly with respect to the oppressed minority index component. This component requires that 10% shareholders have the right to either an appraisal or a judicial review "when they object to fundamental changes, such as mergers, asset dispositions, and changes in the articles of incorporation". All 46 countries in the sample except Mexico and Pakistan grant such rights. However, only 24 are coded as such in LLSV (1998). To be sure, the effectiveness of these rights varies greatly from country to country. But the component definition does not draw any distinctions based on effectiveness, nor would there be an easy way to do so given the multidimensionality of "effectiveness" (e.g., plaintiffs may be favored in one country with respect to costs, and in another with respect to the standard of review).
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B. Data
As mentioned above, the most sensible ways to resolve the ambiguities illustrated in the previous Subsection and the Appendix also generate the highest correlation with the original ADRI and the most similar regression results. In particular, counting default rules seems advisable because for most issues, few public firms diverge from the default arrangements in practice (Listokin 2006; Bergman and Nicolaievsky 2007 Still, the correlation between the corrected and the original ADRI is only .53.
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Of the 46 observations in the sample, 33 had to be corrected -25 of the 30 civil law observations, and 8 of the 16 common law observations. For example, the US score goes down from the sample maximum of 5 to the sample minimum of 2.
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[ Table 1 about here]
The corrections eliminate or even invert the differences between legal origins reported in LLSV (1998). According to LLSV (1998), the mean common law ADRI was statistically significantly higher than the mean of the civil law group as a whole and each of its three sub-families (French, German, Scandinavian), and this holds true with the original ADRI even after omitting the three countries for which corrected data is lacking (not reported). By contrast, with the corrected ADRI, the German family has the highest mean, followed by the Scandinavian family. The French family still has the lowest mean, but the difference to the other families' means is not statistically significant. In particular, the p-value for a two-sided t-test of the equivalence of common and French civil law means is .12.
Again, this is the outcome for the most sensible interpretations, which also turn out to be most closely correlated with, and to generate results most similar to, the original ADRI. Other plausible readings of the definitions from LLSV (1998) would have yielded even greater discrepancies between the original and the corrected data, and even weaker results for legal origin. For example, if the index had been defined so as to preserve the US score of 5, the correlation of corrected and original values would have been .28, and common and civil law means would have been virtually identical (4.38 and 4.37, 21 Correlation coefficients for individual components range from .22 for "oppressed minority mechanism" to .98 for "percentage of shares to call a meeting" (see the Appendix).
22 Two of the corrections are discussed in the preceding Subsection. The third correction is for "proxy by mail". Since LLSV (1998, 1120) expressly excluded stock exchange rules, NYSE and NASDAQ stock exchange rules requiring US-listed corporations to provide shareholders with two-way proxy forms do not count. SEC Rule 14a-4(b) requiring corporations to use two-way proxy forms if they solicit proxies is not sufficient under the most-correlated index component definition (if it were, other countries like the Philippines would have to be corrected, cf. § 9.2 of the old Philippine SEC proxy rules).
respectively). The Appendix reports data for various definitions. The following Sections only refer to those of Table 1 .
III. A NEW INDEX: THE REVISED ADRI (DLLS 2008)
In response to an early manuscript of this paper (Spamann 2005) , DLLS (2008) revised the ADRI. As shown in Table 1 , the revised ADRI from DLLS (2008) differs substantially both from the original ADRI from LLSV (1998) (ρ=.60) and the corrected ADRI from this paper (ρ=.67). The most striking difference to the corrected ADRI of the present paper is that the revised ADRI is on average significantly higher in common than civil law countries.
This difference is not due to either the passage of time or, with few exceptions, disagreement regarding the coding. To assess the importance of time, column 3 of Table   1 Rather, what drives the difference between the revised and the corrected ADRI is that, unlike the present paper, DLLS (2008) not only clarified but also substantially modified some of the index components. DLLS (2008, 433) explicitly takes into account stock exchange rules, whereas LLSV (1998, 1120) explicitly excluded them. Most importantly, the "shares not blocked" and "oppressed minority" index components were redefined in ways that strongly affect the coding but seem to diminish the validity and reliability of the index:
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The modified "shares not blocked" component is set to zero only if the country's law explicitly allows "share blocking"; if the permission is merely implicit, as in a blanket grant of charter freedom, the component is set to one. 25 The most obvious and most severe problem with such a coding rule is that it counts nomenclature, rather than actual legal rules that plausibly shape corporate activity.
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The modified "oppressed minority" component asks whether minority shareholders can challenge resolutions of the board and/or shareholders if they are "unfair, prejudicial, oppressive, or abusive". But without further guidance on how to interpret these broad terms -and there is none in DLLS (2008) -it is impossible to decide whether a country fulfills this criterion or not. The history of English corporate law, from which these terms originate, demonstrates that they admit drastically different interpretations (Davies 2008; Spamann 2006) , including some so narrow as to render them practically irrelevant for public companies (Boyle 2002, 102) . Since DLLS (2008) provides neither a coding protocol nor a data documentation, replication is impossible.
For these reasons, the corrected ADRI of this paper appears to be a superior index than the revised ADRI of DLLS (2008) . In any event, as the next Section demonstrates, it turns out that many of the empirical results obtained with the original ADRI cannot be replicated with either of the two new ADRI measures, or for that matter with any other measure of investor protection now available.
IV. REVISITING REGRESSION RESULTS
A. Investor Protection and Ownership Concentration
Besides the link between investor protection and legal origins, the main empirical result of "Law and Finance" (LLSV 1998) was that investor protection is negatively related to ownership concentration in publicly traded companies across countries. LLS (1999) confirmed this result with more detailed ownership concentration data for a smaller sample of countries. However, these results appear to have been artifacts of coding error in the original ADRI. Neither of them can be replicated with the corrected data, or with any of the other shareholder protection indices now available.
[ Table 2 about here] 27 Gini data is missing in LLSV (1999), and come from World Bank (1997, 2001, 2006) and (for Taiwan) Deininger and Squire (1996) . 28 These additional data are from LLS (2006) and Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) , respectively. Accounting data is missing for the other 8 countries for which the original ADRI was collected by LLSV (1998). Models 2, 4, and 6 use the improved creditor rights index from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) for all countries; however, the results are very similar if one uses the original creditor rights index from LLSV (1998) for all countries except Venezuela.
already reported no significant relationship between the anti-self-dealing index and ownership concentration in a different empirical model, controlling only for log GDP per capita and the time to collect on a bounced check.
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[ Table 3 about here] (2008), or the quality of accounting, as in LLSV (1998); if either of these were included in the regression, the result for the anti-self-dealing index would be far from statistically significant.
Of the indices of securities disclosure and liability from LLS (2006), only the latter is significantly negatively correlated with ownership concentration in regressions as in Table 2 (p=.07 and p=.03 in the small and large sample, respectively). However, the theoretical case for this connection is weak, and the prior empirical literature has not linked securities law and ownership dispersion.
B. Investor Protection and Capital Market Size
The third major result of the early "Law and Finance" literature was that the original ADRI strongly correlated with stock market size (LLSV 1997) . Again, this relationship breaks down with the corrected ADRI. 31 In re-runs of regressions from LLSV (1997), the coefficients for the corrected ADRI reported in panel B of Table 4 are not only statistically indistinguishable from zero, but even negative in three of the six regressions.
[ Table 4 about here]
Except for using the corrected ADRI, the regression specifications and data underlying Table 4 are identical to those in LLSV (1997). The one difference is that Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe are omitted from all the regressions because corrected ADRI data is not available for them. This omission does not drive the results.
As reported in panel A of Table 4 
C. Investor Protection and the Asian Financial Crisis
As an example of the effect that correcting the legal data may have on the many other results derived with the ADRI, consider Johnson et al. (2000) . This paper famously 31 The Appendix also presents a corrected "one share -one vote" variable, and Spamann (2006) shows that regression results in LLSV (1997) linking the original "one share -one vote" variable to equity market size cannot be replicated with the corrected variable.
found that emerging markets with low ADRI values suffered significantly deeper exchange rate depreciations during the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Model 1 of Table 5 replicates this result using the same specification and data as Johnson et al. (2000) .
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However, in the otherwise identical regressions of Models 2 and 3, the point estimate is zero for the corrected ADRI, and even negative for the revised ADRI.
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[ Table 5 about here]
To be sure, Johnson et al. (2000) also showed significant regression results for a survey measure of corporate governance collected in the spring of 1998. But as that paper notes, this measure -and, one should add, any other measure referencing rules or perceptions after 1997 -could already have been affected by the crisis, and is therefore inappropriate for these tests. (Table 5 reports the results for the revised ADRI merely for the sake of transparency.) 34 By contrast, the corrected ADRI counts rules in force as of January 1, 1997, and is therefore ideal for these regressions. The corrected ADRI, however, provides no evidence for the claimed connection between corporate governance and the Asian financial crisis.
D. Investor Protection and the Allocation of Capital
Some results derived with the original ADRI do survive. For example, the link between efficient capital allocation and investor rights documented in is generally as strong with the corrected or the revised ADRI as with the original ADRI.
32 Johnson et al. (2000) also ran these regressions without the other controls, and with interactions of the ADRI and rule of law, judicial efficiency, or corruption instead of the ADRI. The corrected and the revised ADRI do not yield significant results in these specifications either (unreported). The one exception is that the interaction of the corrected ADRI with judicial efficiency does yield a significantly positive coefficient. However, this is driven entirely by the correlation of the interaction term with judicial efficiency. If the interacted variables are also included separately in the regression, neither the ADRI nor the interaction term has any relationship to exchange rate depreciation.
33 Since a corrected ADRI value for Indonesia is unavailable, these regressions use the original ADRI value for Indonesia instead. If anything, this will bias the results for the corrected ADRI upwards because the original ADRI value for Indonesia is the sample minimum for both the original and the corrected ADRI, and Indonesia had the worst exchange rate depreciation. Omitting Indonesia entirely yields even weaker results for all ADRI variants. 34 Unreported regressions show no relationship between depth of the crisis and the anti-self-dealing index of DLLS (2008).
[ Table 6 about here] Table 6 shows coefficients and standard errors for the "rights" variable in regressions imitating those of . "Rights" is the sum of the creditor rights index from LLSV (1998) and the original, corrected, or revised ADRI, respectively. The regressions underlying panel A are identical to those of except that Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe are omitted in order to match the sample available for the corrected ADRI; this translates into three lost observations in models 1 and 3 and one lost observation (Indonesia) in models 2 and 4. Notwithstanding the reduced sample, the results are essentially the same as in .
In panels B and C, the original ADRI has been replaced by the corrected or the revised ADRI, respectively, in creating the rights variable. For both variants, the correlation with the elasticity of manufacturing investment to value added is stronger and more robust than for the original ADRI. Inversely, the correlation with the elasticity differential between growing and declining years is weaker and less robust.
E. Other results
The preceding Subsections were merely examples of the broader implication of this Model 1 is an exact replication of LLSV (1998). Models 3 and 5 substitute the corrected ADRI from this paper and the revised ADRI from DLLS (2008), respectively, for the original ADRI from LLSV (1998). Models 2, 4, and 6 include additional ownership concentration data for Uruguay from LLS (2006), and substitute the revised Creditor Rights Index (1994) from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) for the original Creditor Rights Index from LLSV (1998), which adds Venezuela to the sample. All other variables are taken from and defined in LLSV (1998 LLSV ( , 1999 , except the Gini coefficients (Taiwan data from Deininger and Squire 1996 , and other data from World Bank 1997 , taking the measurement closest to 1994). OLS regressions; robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 A country's ADRI is high if it is greater than the median, which is 3, 4, and 4 for the original ADRI from LLSV (1998), the corrected ADRI from this paper, and the revised ADRI from DLLS (2008), respectively. A firm does not have a controlling shareholder if no shareholder holds, directly or indirectly, at least 10 or 20%, respectively of the voting rights in the firm; these data are from, and further explained in, LLS 1999. Each cell corresponds to a separate regression, showing only the coefficient and standard error for the ADRI variable. All regressions control for GDP growth (average 1970 (average -1993 (average ), log(GNP 1994 , and rule of law. The regression specifications are identical to those in LLSV (1997), except for the use of the corrected ADRI from this paper and the revised ADRI from DLLS (2008) in Panels B and C, respectively, and the omission of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe from the sample. All other variables are taken from and defined in LLSV (1997 LLSV ( , 1999 . OLS regressions, standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Model 1 is an exact replication of Johnson et al. (2000) . Models 2 and 3 substitute the corrected ADRI from this paper and the revised ADRI from DLLS (2008), respectively, for the original ADRI from LLSV (1998). The East Asia dummy is equal to one for Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan. Reserves are central bank reserves in billions of dollars at the end of 1996. Data for reserves and exchange rate depreciation are from Johnson et al. (2000) . ‡ For Indonesia, the value used is that of the original ADRI (2). OLS regressions; standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Each cell corresponds to a separate regression, showing only the coefficient and standard error for the sum of the ADRI and the creditor rights index ("rights"). All regressions include a constant. The regression specifications are identical to those of models 3 and 6-8 of table 5 in , except for the use of the corrected ADRI from this paper and the revised ADRI from DLLS (2008) in Panels B and C, respectively, and the omission of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe from the sample. 
